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This paper investigates regional differences in the perception of corruption and infor-
mal practices among Ukrainian ﬁrms. Using two different data sets from Ukraine, we
show that perceived corruption differs signiﬁcantly across regions, even when taking
into account the size, industry, workforce composition, and other characteristics of
the ﬁrms based on propensity score matching. In particular, perceived corruption is
highest in the Eastern oblasts and lowest in the West, which points to distinct busi-
ness practices that may be rooted in the different histories of Ukrainian regions.
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1. Introduction
Analyzing business corruption from different disciplinary perspectives, scholars, and
practitioners have underscored its negative impact on organizations and countries in the
global context (cf. Rose-Ackerman 1978; North 1990; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, and
Shleifer 1999; Williamson 2000; Karklins 2005; Godfrey 2011; Lessig 2013; Thompson
2013; Johnston 2014). Expanding expertise on this topic, together with the longstanding
efforts of such international agencies as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, as well as national governments has not led to any signiﬁcant curtailment of cor-
ruption, which is still present and remains one of the main challenges in doing business
in many countries (cf. Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Mauro 1995; Fisman and Svensson
2007; Galang 2012; Shekshnia, Ledeneva, and Denisova-Schmidt 2014). One of these
countries is Ukraine, where corruption is arguably the greatest obstacle facing domestic
companies in their business activities and for foreign companies seeking to expand their
activities in the country, making it an inhibitor of economic growth and, as recent
events in Ukraine demonstrate, a promoter of political instability as well.
Many international rankings cite Ukraine as one of the most corrupt countries in the
world (Table 1). In its 2013 index, for example, Transparency International, an NGO
providing research and data on worldwide corruption, scored Ukrainian corruption as 25
on a scale from 0 (extremely corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt).1 Freedom from corruption,
according to the Heritage Foundation’s 2013 Index of Economic Freedom, is 23 for
Ukraine on a scale from 0 (not free from corruption) to 100 (free from corruption). The
World Bank ranked Ukraine’s control of corruption at −1.03 on a range from −2.5
to +2.5, with the negative numbers indicating higher levels of corruption. By compari-
son, Ukraine’s rankings are quite similar to those of Russia, another country with a poor
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reputation for corruption, and not that different from the Democratic Republic of
Congo.
Business corruption in Ukraine is not an isolated phenomenon; however, it is tightly
embedded into general corruption in society: in politics (cf. Čábelková and Hanousek
2004; Wilson 2005; Neutze and Karatnycky 2007), education (cf. Osipian 2008, 2010;
Round and Rodgers 2009; Klein 2012), and in everyday life. Households might for
instance install special devices (zhuk) to roll back the numbers on an electricity meter or
use other techniques to shift the costs of gas and water consumption (Leipnik and
Kyrychenko 2013). Individuals might prefer to pay their examining doctor informally
(approx. USD$36) rather than make a formal payment to the hospital (approx. USD
$24).2 Bribes, exchanging favors, donations to schools for the purpose of favorable
assessments (for example, for enrollment or higher grades) or cheating during exams,
plagiarism, ghostwriting, and receiving marks not on the basis of academic achievement,
but on the monetary and non-monetary interests of professors is a common reality and
not an exception. Bribes at public institutions are usually justiﬁed by rational-based or
value-based reasons such as simplifying ofﬁcial procedures or supplementing state sala-
ries. The reforms combating corruption that were promised by the leaders of the Orange
Revolution3 did not bring the effects one might have hoped for (Grødeland 2010).
Scholars studying business corruption in Ukraine analyze this issue from different
perspectives. Pleines (2005, 2010) emphasizes the link between large businesses, poli-
tics, and the role of “oligarchs,” a relatively small group of business people who control
a substantial share of the country’s wealth and who frequently exercise political power
directly or indirectly. Many see the rent-seeking behavior of this inﬂuential group as the
most detrimental form of corruption and informal practices in Ukraine, at least with
regard to the country’s economic development and rise in inequality. As documented in
Table 1. Ranking of corruption in Ukraine: dynamics from 2009 to 2013.
Indicator (Institution) Country 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Corruption perception index (Transparency
International) 0 = most corrupt, 10 = not
corrupt (2009–2011); 0 = most corrupt,
100 = not corrupt (2012–2013)
USA 7.5 7.1 7.1 73 73
Germany 8.0 7.9 8.0 79 78
Russia 2.2 2.1 2.4 28 28
Ukraine 2.2 2.4 2.3 26 25
Congo,
Dem.
Rep.
1.9 2.0 2.0 21 22
Freedom from corruption/index of economic
freedom (Heritage Foundation) 0 = most
corrupt, 100 = corruption free
USA 72 73 75 71 71
Germany 78 79 80 79 80
Russia 23 21 22 21 24
Ukraine 27 25 22 24 23
Congo,
Dem.
Rep.
19 17 19 20 20
Control of corruption/worldwide governance
indicators (World Bank) −2.5 = most corrupt,
+2.5 = least corrupt
USA 1.26 1.26 1.27 1.38 N/A
Germany 1.72 1.74 1.71 1.78 N/A
Russia −1.09 −1.06 −1.04 −1.01 N/A
Ukraine −1.01 −0.98 −1.00 −1.03 N/A
Congo,
Dem.
Rep.
−1.36 −1.42 −1.40 −1.30 N/A
Note: Transparency International changed their scoring system to whole numbers in 2012.
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Åslund (2001, 2005), oligarchs have frequently misused government power to extract
formal decisions granting themselves subsidies, tax exemptions, and regulatory privi-
leges, and to either act outside the law themselves, or to induce the illegal behavior of
government ofﬁcials without facing legal consequences. In the 1990s, this allowed them
to secure annual beneﬁts of several billion USD in the non-transparent and monopolistic
business of gas imports from Russia – the initial backbone of their wealth – using tricks
like diverging nominal and real gas prices or even the blunt theft of gas from the main
pipeline to Western Europe.
Markovskaya, Pridemore, and Nakajima (2003) explore the presence and impact of
corruption in the ﬁnancial markets. Bilotkach (2006) describes the various forms of tax
evasion Ukrainian enterprises use to conceal their activities. Leipnik and Kyrychenko
(2013) show the cheating techniques small and large businesses may apply to shift the
costs of their utilities. Peretiatko et al. (2009) argue that despite “the difﬁculties of oper-
ating in the Ukrainian business environment, with its twin problems of bureaucracy and
corruption,” some forms of entry seem to be successful, such as franchising. Rodgers,
William, and Round (2008) describe criminal workplace activities, such as employers
who pay their staff in cash in order to reduce their payroll tax obligations, or employees
who take advantage of different mechanisms to use company property for private gain.
Despite the fact that business corruption per se is widespread and important, the
practice remains under-researched.4 The reasons for this are twofold: corruption is not
an easy topic to study, nor is it a term that can be straightforwardly deﬁned. Few busi-
ness representatives will talk about corruption if they are asked about it directly. By
admitting their involvement in corruption they make themselves culpable – and by
denying this fact, they render themselves implausible. Hence it might be more produc-
tive to ask business representatives not about corruption, but about their daily activities.
Corruption is usually deﬁned as “the misuse of public power, ofﬁce or authority for
private beneﬁt – through bribery, extortion, inﬂuence peddling, nepotism, fraud, speed
money of embezzlement” (UNDP) or “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”
(Transparency International) or “the abuse of public ofﬁce for private gain” (World
Bank). The words might differ, but corruption is often understood as the “twisting” of
something public into something private. The idea of private property is a relatively
new one for post-Soviet Ukraine; however,5 excluding the western part of the country,
where private property existed until 1939.6
Motivated by the heterogeneous historical development of the present day Ukraine
(also in terms of business practices), this paper examines the differences in the perception
of corruption and informal practices among companies operating in Ukraine across its dif-
ferent regions. Our research is therefore related to a study by Becker et al. (2011), which
analyzed reports of corrupt behavior among individuals in several Eastern European
countries near the border of the former Habsburg Empire. They found that those living
within the former Habsburg territory were less inclined to bribe the police or the courts
than those outside, even after controlling for several socioeconomic characteristics. The
research question of our study differs from theirs, in that we focus on perceived
corruption among ﬁrms (rather than among individuals) situated in Ukraine (rather than
in several countries).
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique business survey of Ukrainian companies that
was conducted in 2013 and contains a wealth of ﬁrm characteristics including size, industry,
employee structure, ﬁnancial indicators, and other parameters. As a second data source, we
have also considered the 2008–2009 wave of the Business Environment and Enterprise
Performance Survey (BEEPS) provided by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
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Development (EBRD) and the World Bank. Our estimation strategy relies on matching (see
Rubin 1974), which aims at making ﬁrms across various regions as similar as possible in
terms of their observed characteristics. Any mean difference in perceived corruption and
informal practices after controlling for these ﬁrm characteristics is interpreted as inherently
“regional” and possibly related to distinct historical, political, or cultural factors. Our results
indeed suggest that considerable regional variations exist even after accounting for the
industry type, employee structure, and other characteristics. In particular, perceived corrup-
tion is higher in the eastern areas than in the south and the west, which appear to have the
lowest perceived levels of corruption and informal practices.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the data
and provides descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the identiﬁcation strategy, while
Section 4 outlines our estimation based on propensity score matching. The results are
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
This research project is based on two different data-sets. The ﬁrst data-set comes from a
survey conducted among Ukrainian ﬁrms between January and March 2013 by Socioin-
form on behalf of a joint project of researchers at the Ivan Franko National University
of L’viv (Ukraine) and the University of St. Gallen (Switzerland). The sample is com-
prised of 625 ﬁrms, which are stratiﬁed by region and size. Twenty-ﬁve ﬁrms were sam-
pled in each of Ukraine’s 24 oblasti (singular: oblast), the regular regional
administrative units, as well as in the Republic of Crimea (Krym), which possesses a
special autonomous status. It is worth noting that in addition to the 25 regions men-
tioned so far, there are two federal cities that constitute administrative entities on their
own: the capital city of Kyiv and the Crimean seaport of Sevastopol, where the Russian
Black Sea Fleet is based. In the sampling design, however, these cities were not consid-
ered as separate units, so that ﬁrms from the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol were sam-
pled along with companies from the oblast of Kyiv and the Republic of Crimea,
respectively. As outlined below, sampling based on regions allows us to cluster observa-
tions of several administrative units into larger units based on historical regions. Twenty
percent of the sample consisted of small businesses of 20–50 employees, 50 percent
were mid-sized companies (51–250 employees), and 30 percent were large enterprises
(251–1000 employees). The data do not include very small (fewer than 20 employees)
and very large companies (more than 1000 employees).
This survey contains rich information on a range of ﬁrm characteristics as of 2013,
including, for example, legal form and ownership structure, ﬁrm size (number of
employees), city size where the ﬁrm is located, industry, and occupations (share of
employees in production, sales, administration, and other areas). Also included are
ﬁnancial indicators such as the annual sales and net beneﬁts in 2011 and 2012, share of
imports (in inputs) and exports (in sales), assets and liabilities, and the amount and
source of newly invested capital in 2012. Several questions are devoted to characterizing
the employee structure, such as the workforce composition in terms of gender and edu-
cation, the share of blue/white collar workers and trainees, the employee growth over
the last three years and the planned growth over the coming three years, and manage-
ment’s satisfaction with employee motivation and qualiﬁcation. The survey also covers
ﬁrm policies and procedures concerning health services, bonus payments, and employee
training, as well as organizational aspects like innovation in the development or acquisi-
tion of new patents or the introduction of new products and outsourcing. Finally, survey
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respondents were asked to judge the occurrence and severity of corruption and informal
practices in various public institutions and the consequences for their ﬁrms’ activities,
which will serve as outcome variables.
To address one of the challenges in analyzing corruption – getting insider informa-
tion on such a sensitive issue – we decided to use the approach developed and tested in
the Russian business environment by Shekshnia, Ledeneva, and Denisova-Schmidt
(Ledeneva and Shekshnia 2011; Denisova-Schmidt 2012; Shekshnia, Ledeneva, and
Denisova-Schmidt 2013, 2014). The researchers “coded” corruption as “informal prac-
tices” – the practical norms CEOs and managers usually use to get things done. Ques-
tions were asked in a way that made it possible to get information about less
reprehensible but more widespread forms of corruption such as collusion, conﬂict of
interest, cronyism and nepotism, fraud, gifts and hospitality, lobbying, abuse of power
or ofﬁce, and inﬂuence peddling.
To address the other challenge in analyzing corruption – a proper deﬁnition of this
term – we use the regional information provided in our data. That is, we base our analysis
on clustering ﬁrms in the 25 administrative units into a coarser set of arguably historically
and culturally distinct regions. Our deﬁnition of ﬁve regions is heavily inspired by the
arguments brought forward in Barrington and Herron (2004), but yet rougher than the
eight-region division proposed therein, mainly due to small sample issues. We neverthe-
less think that our classiﬁcation into east, north, south, west central, and west adequately
captures the historical differences across the Ukrainian regions. The eastern region con-
sists of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk oblasti and
comprises the most the Russiﬁed part of Ukraine, having the longest common history
with Russia. The northern region includes Poltava, Kirovohrad, Cherkasy, Chernihiv, and
Sumy. The oblast and the capital city of Kyiv would also fall into this geographical area,
but are excluded because (1) being the country’s capital makes the city distinct to any
region in terms of administrative and political signiﬁcance, and (2) the city and the oblast
cannot be distinguished in the data. As discussed in Barrington and Herron (2004), the
north is different from the east in that it did not come under Russian control until the mid-
dle 1600s to the late 1700s and is less ethnically and linguistically Russian.
As suggested by Barrington and Herron (2004), the southern region consists of
Kherson, Odesa, and Mikolaiv. Much of this area (which is ethnically less Russian than
the east) had been under Ottoman Turkish rule until the late 1700s, when Russia gained
control. Note that the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is excluded from the southern
region due to its arguably distinct culture and history and therefore omitted from our
analysis altogether, as the sample size would be too small to treat it as region on its
own. Barrington and Herron (2004) remark that Russian-dominated Crimea was the last
area to join Ukraine (transferred from the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
in 1954) and the only one that did not strongly support independence in 1991, making
it by any standard the least Ukrainian part of the country, which also becomes apparent
in the current Crimean crisis.
In line with Barrington and Herron (2004), the west central region is composed of
Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Khmelnytskyi, Rivne, and Volyn. For centuries, these areas had
been part of Poland before falling under the control of Russia as a result of the Second
and Third Partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795. Finally, the western region consists of
Chernivtsi, Zakarpatia, Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk. What these areas have in
common is that they belonged to the Austro-Hungarian Habsburg Empire since (at least)
the late eighteenth century (and up to 1918) as a result of the First Partition of Poland
in 1772 (bringing Lviv, Ternopil, and Ivano-Frankivsk) and the defeat of the Ottomans
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in the Russo-Turkish War of 1768–1774 (allowing the annexation of Chernivtsi by the
Austrians as part of the Bukovina province). Zakarpatia had already been part of
Hungary and the Habsburg Empire.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the means for various ﬁrm characteristics
across regions to give an idea of the geographical differences in the distributions of
companies in our sample. We see, for instance, that eastern companies are on average
substantially larger than those in other parts of the country; they are more concentrated
in sectors like manufacturing and wholesale and have a workforce that is on average
better educated. As discussed further below, controlling for such differences in ﬁrm vari-
ables will be crucial for assessing regional differences in perceived corruption.
The second data-set comes from the BEEPS, which is a joint initiative of the EBRD
and the World Bank. The survey focuses on ﬁrms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia
to assess the business development and environment. In its fourth round (2008–2009),
the BEEPS covered roughly 11,800 ﬁrms in 29 countries. Here, we make use of the
Ukrainian subsample collected from May to August 2008 and comprising 851 ﬁrms.
The data were obtained using a stratiﬁed random sampling7 based on industry (manufac-
turing, retail trade, or other services), ﬁrm size (3 strata: 5–19 employees, 20–99
employees, and 100–10,000 employees), and region.
Table 2. Descriptives (main data).
Region East North South
W.
Centr West
Number of employees 380.768 239.376 178.640 209.040 236.192
Sector: agriculture (binary) 0.080 0.064 0.120 0.064 0.096
Sector: mining (binary) 0.072 0.120 0.080 0.112 0.072
Sector: construction (binary) 0.032 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.064
Sector: manufacturing (binary) 0.408 0.344 0.227 0.344 0.360
Sector: wholesale (binary) 0.144 0.088 0.133 0.136 0.120
Sector: transport (binary) 0.064 0.096 0.080 0.112 0.088
Sector: information (binary) 0.200 0.256 0.320 0.192 0.200
Share of females 0.412 0.413 0.472 0.428 0.432
Share of fulltime employees 0.869 0.888 0.860 0.900 0.824
Share of employees with high school degree 0.304 0.307 0.399 0.342 0.383
Share of employees with bachelor’s degree 0.348 0.426 0.301 0.360 0.346
Share of employees with master’s degree 0.347 0.267 0.293 0.292 0.272
Share of workers 0.745 0.756 0.754 0.775 0.771
Share of middle management 0.151 0.138 0.132 0.142 0.149
Share of top management 0.073 0.084 0.078 0.065 0.061
Share of employees in sales 0.077 0.064 0.050 0.056 0.056
Share of employees in production 0.711 0.711 0.733 0.729 0.773
Share of employees in R&D 0.022 0.016 0.003 0.019 0.008
Foreign ownership (binary) 0.032 0.008 0.027 0.024 0.016
Exporter (binary) 0.256 0.152 0.107 0.280 0.336
Share of exports of total sales 0.078 0.051 0.024 0.105 0.138
Gross revenue: up to 5 mio hryvnias (binary) 0.448 0.568 0.493 0.456 0.384
Gross revenue: 5–20 mio hryvnias (binary) 0.200 0.240 0.267 0.264 0.304
Gross revenue: 20–50 mio hryvnias (binary) 0.088 0.048 0.093 0.096 0.152
Gross revenue: 50–100 mio hryvnias (binary) 0.056 0.032 0.093 0.072 0.088
Gross revenue missing (binary) 0.128 0.088 0.027 0.080 0.032
Introduced new products (binary) 0.416 0.312 0.240 0.416 0.600
Business development in last 3 years (1: very bad,
… ,5: very good)
3.304 3.416 3.480 3.536 3.656
Number of observations 125 125 75 125 125
Eurasian Geography and Economics 15
The BEEPS provides a wealth of ﬁrm characteristics, including ﬁrm and city size,
legal form and ownership structure, industry, ﬁnancial information (among others, annual
sales in the ﬁscal year before the survey), assets and liabilities (for example, loans),
imports/exports, innovation and organizational changes (introduction of new products,
discontinued product line, and outsourcing in last three years). It also contains workforce
composition (percentage who are university graduates, number of male/female and
skilled/unskilled production workers, problems due to inadequate education), formal
training activities, and some information about the judgment on informal practices and
corruption. Concerning the regional distribution in BEEPS, 168 ﬁrms were sampled in
the oblast of Kyiv, 159 in the east, 186 in the north, 172 in the south, and 166 in the
west. One disadvantage (besides the age of the data) compared to our ﬁrst data-set is that
these regions do not necessarily correspond to the historical regions of Ukraine. For
instance, the south includes both the Republic of Crimea and other southern regions, in
spite of their very distinct historical and cultural development. Table 3 gives the means
for various ﬁrm characteristics across regions in the BEEPS. Again, there is considerable
variation in the number of employees, the mix of sectors, and the composition of the
workforce (for instance education) across various regions.
3. Identiﬁcation
Our goal is to estimate the regional differences in the ﬁrms’ perceived level of corrup-
tion/informal practices net of effects rooted in speciﬁc regional compositions of ﬁrms,
so that these differences can be attributed to distinct cultural, political, and historical
developments. That is, we are interested in the extent to which the regional effect on
the ﬁrms’ assessment of corruption and informal practices can be inherently explained
by cultural differences rather than by ﬁrm attributes such as size or industry. This
requires controlling for any ﬁrm characteristics that are likely correlated with both per-
ceived corruption and geographical region. If, for instance, the ﬁrms in a particular
Table 3. Descriptives (BEEPS).
Region East Kyiv North South West
Number of full-time employed 102.673 128.238 136.703 83.807 115.767
Number of temporarily employed 8.107 2.912 4.714 4.892 7.790
Sector: textile (binary) 0.098 0.142 0.174 0.146 0.135
Sector: chemicals (binary) 0.012 0.011 0.008 0.017 0.015
Sector: metal processing (binary) 0.037 0.046 0.047 0.030 0.023
Sector: machinery (binary) 0.063 0.096 0.131 0.146 0.102
Sector: construction (binary) 0.103 0.032 0.068 0.052 0.060
Sector: services (binary) 0.257 0.195 0.123 0.185 0.173
Sector: wholesale (binary) 0.065 0.096 0.059 0.056 0.060
Sector: retail (binary) 0.143 0.135 0.140 0.133 0.154
Share of females 0.475 0.295 0.438 0.521 0.412
Share with university degree 0.388 0.440 0.269 0.360 0.344
Share of employees in production 0.507 0.470 0.495 0.460 0.461
Company publicly listed (binary) 0.044 0.085 0.140 0.112 0.098
Exporter (binary) 0.145 0.262 0.288 0.180 0.203
Gross revenue in mio 18.189 19.434 11.885 7.313 5.939
Gross revenue missing 0.262 0.216 0.292 0.412 0.180
Introduced new products (binary) 0.519 0.624 0.555 0.494 0.474
Outsourced parts of prod. (binary) 0.105 0.213 0.144 0.099 0.143
Number of observations 428 282 236 233 266
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industry or with a strong export orientation are more severely exposed to corruption –
and, at the same time, more likely to be concentrated in a particular region – then the
inherently culture-rooted regional effect will be confounded by industry or the level of
exports, unless we account for the latter two characteristics in our econometric analysis.
We will now formally discuss the identiﬁcation of the regional effect of interest
based on the potential outcome framework; see for instance Rubin (1974). To this end,
let D 2 f1; 2; . . .;Rg be a discrete variable indicating in which of the 1 to R different
historical regions a ﬁrm is situated. Y is the observed outcome variable, one of the mea-
sures of corruption and informal practices. By Y 1; Y 2; . . .; YR we denote the potential
outcomes that would be realized if a particular ﬁrm was (re-) located to regions D = 1,
2,… , R, while all other ﬁrm characteristics are kept constant. Note that only one of the
R potential outcomes is actually observed, namely that for the region in which the ﬁrm
is actually located: Y ¼PRd¼1 IfD ¼ dg  Yd , where IfD ¼ dg is the indicator function,
which is equal to 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise.
In our analysis, we treat the eastern region in both data-sets as the reference region,
to which we assign d = 1 and to which all other regions are compared. The reason is
that several authors found corruption and informal practices to be more common in the
east than in other Ukrainian regions (Becker et al. 2011). We are interested in how dif-
ferent ﬁrms in the east would, on average, evaluate corruption and informal practices
had they been relocated to a different counterfactual region (Yd for some d 6¼ 1), while
keeping any other ﬁrm characteristics that may also affect perceived corruption ﬁxed.
Therefore, the parameter we would like to estimate is the mean difference in potential
outcomes between Y 1 and Yd (with d 6¼ 1) among those ﬁrms with D = 1. This corre-
sponds to the average regional effect on corruption perception among ﬁrms in the east,
which we denote by h1d , and is deﬁned as follows:
h1d ¼ E½Y 1  YdjD ¼ 1; d 2 f2; . . .;Rg (1)
Equation (1) explicates that the average regional effect on eastern ﬁrms can be deﬁned
with respect to any potential (non-eastern) region (d 6¼ 1), so that multiple effects h1d ,
… ,h1R may be assessed (east vs. south, east vs. west … ). This is closely related to the
multiple treatment framework proposed in Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001).
To identify these regional effects among ﬁrms in the east, we will rely on the assump-
tion that all of the ﬁrm characteristics that are jointly associated with the region and the
corruption outcomes can be observed in the data. This will allow the ﬁnding of ﬁrms in
other regions that are comparable (in terms of the relevant characteristics) to those in the
east and therefore serve as counterfactual observations under a hypothetical relocation of
the eastern ﬁrms. To this end, let X denote the vector of observed ﬁrm characteristics
(such as size, industry, and employee structure). We will assume that within any sub-
group of ﬁrms located either in the east or in one of the other regions (for example the
west), the potential outcome for being located in the respective other region is indepen-
dent of the actual location (in the east or the other region) after controlling for X. This
corresponds to the conditional independence assumption (CIA) for multiple treatments of
Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001), which is formally stated in Appendix 2.8
The CIA only appears plausible if our set of observed covariates is rich enough to
include all of the characteristics that could potentially confound the regional effect. This
assumption is inherently untestable, but we argue that it is likely to be (closely) satisﬁed
in our case. First, our data contains a battery of characteristics that are likely to be cor-
related with the location; for example, the industry, import/export share, workforce com-
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position, and the occupational distribution. Second, we have thorough information about
the ﬁnancial situation and business activities (such as innovation and outsourcing) that
may also affect the judgment of or inclination to corruption and informal practices.
Finally, we can also control for municipality size, which is important if perceived cor-
ruption differs systematically with the latter and ﬁrms are more likely to be situated in
larger municipalities in one region than another.
As second identifying assumption, we impose a common support restriction stating
that no value x among all possible values of X perfectly predicts that ﬁrms are located
in the east. Otherwise, no comparable ﬁrms could be found in the other region for east-
ern companies with such particular x. This common support assumption is formally sta-
ted in Appendix 2. Under both assumptions, the average regional effect on ﬁrms in the
east is identiﬁed by
h1d ¼ E½Y jD ¼ 1  EX ½E½Y jD ¼ d;X jD ¼ 1
¼ E½Y jD ¼ 1  Ep1dðX Þ½E½Y jD ¼ d; p1dðX ÞjD ¼ 1; d 2 f2; . . .;Rg;
where p1dðxÞ ¼ PrðD ¼ 1jX ¼ x;D ¼ 1; dÞ denotes the conditional probability (or propen-
sity score) to be located in the east given ﬁrm characteristics X in the subpopulation with
either D = 1 or D = d (i.e. ﬁrms in the east and in one of the regions identiﬁed by d). The
regional effects can therefore be identiﬁed by matching eastern ﬁrms to ﬁrms in other regions
with comparable propensity scores. A formal proof for this result is given in Appendix 2.
4. Estimation
For the estimation of θ1d, we ﬁrst estimate p1d(X) in both data-sets within each of the
respective subsamples of ﬁrms with D = 1,d (and d 2 f2; . . .;Rg) based on probit speciﬁ-
cations. In the probit speciﬁcations, which are presented in Appendix 1, X includes, among
other things, the ﬁrm size, industry, import/export orientation, ownership structure, work-
force composition, annual sales, innovation, and size of the municipality. In a second step,
we apply within each subsample the propensity score radius matching algorithm of Lech-
ner, Miquel, and Wunsch (2011), which was found to be competitive among a range of
estimators in the simulation study of Huber, Lechner, and Wunsch (2013). The algorithm
of the estimator is provided in Table A.1. In brief, this matching algorithm relies on the
idea of matching to some reference ﬁrm in the east all ﬁrms in the respective other region
whose propensity scores are within a particular distance (or radius) to that of the reference
ﬁrm. In a second step, the outcomes of the matched ﬁrms (within the radius) are weighted
according to their distances from the propensity score of the reference ﬁrm in order to esti-
mate the potential outcome of the eastern ﬁrm, had it been relocated to the other region.
Third, a bias correction based on a linear regression of Y on X is applied to the potential
outcome. Finally, θ1d is estimated by computing the potential outcomes for all ﬁrms in the
east and taking the mean difference between the observed outcomes in the east and the
respective estimated potential outcomes.
For radius matching, several estimation options or tuning parameters have to be cho-
sen (see Huber, Lechner, and Steinmayr (2012) for a comprehensive discussion). Most
importantly, the size of the radius of admissible distances in propensity scores needs to
be deﬁned. We set the latter at twice the maximum distance in the propensity score
occurring when matching each eastern ﬁrm to its respective closest observation in the
other region. However, the estimates presented in the next section are rather insensitive
to other choices of the radius (namely, when using the maximum distance or three times
18 E. Denisova-Schmidt and M. Huber
this difference as radius). Second, we impose a so-called common support restriction,
requiring that eastern ﬁrms with larger propensity scores than the largest value among
ﬁrms in the other region are not used for estimation (see Dehejia and Wahba 1999). The
idea is that eastern ﬁrms whose propensity scores are so high that no comparable ﬁrm
in the other region can be found (i.e. are “off support”) should be discarded from the
sample in order to avoid bad (or incomparable) matches that may cause bias. The price
to pay is that the estimated effect then only refers to the observations for which com-
mon support restriction is satisﬁed (i.e. are “on support”), and its relevance for the ini-
tial sample may be questionable if many observations had to be discarded. For this
reason, for each estimate in the empirical section, we report the number of observations
that are on and off support. A ﬁnal choice concerns the inference to assess the signiﬁ-
cance of the estimate of θ1d. Here, we estimate the p-values based on bootstrapping the
t-statistics of the effect estimates as outlined in Huber, Lechner, and Steinmayr (2012).
5. Results
This section presents the assessment of the results for regional differences in a range of
outcomes, measuring the perceived level of corruption and informal practices in public
institutions and business life, as well as the implications for and (counter-) strategies
conducted by the ﬁrms.
The ﬁrst question was asked about the prevalence of informal practices and corrup-
tion in several institutions: tax inspection, customs, courts, the police, sanitation service,
ﬁre inspection, and local, regional and federal administrations, to be evaluated on a
scale from 1 (never) to 5 (systematically). Extortion of bribes and non-monetary favors
by the control and enforcement bodies seems to be one of the most common forms of
corruption in post-Soviet territory, including, for example, in Russia (see Shekshnia,
Ledeneva, and Denisova-Schmidt 2013, 2014). This also increased during the recent rai-
der attacks in Ukraine: falsiﬁed court resolutions and procuring tax inspections are “the
most common vehicles of ‘gray’ raider attacks” (Zimmerer 2012).9
The second column of Table 4 gives the respective average responses among ﬁrms
in the east, while columns 3–6 show the mean (raw) differences between the east and
the respective other regions, unadjusted for the observed ﬁrm characteristics X. Columns
7–10 provide the estimates of the regional effects; i.e. the differences in the outcomes
after adjusting for X by matching the eastern ﬁrms to comparable companies in the
respective other regions. For all differences, p-values based on 999 bootstrap replica-
tions are provided in brackets. Furthermore, “on support” reports the number of obser-
vations in the east and the respective other region for which the common support
restriction of Dehejia and Wahba (1999) is satisﬁed (see Section 5). “Off support” indi-
cates the number of eastern ﬁrms with propensity scores too high to ﬁnd suitable
matches in the other region. Common support is generally highest when comparing east
to west central, where fewer than 10 eastern ﬁrms have to be discarded, and least satis-
factory when comparing east to south, where the share of dropped observations is
around 20 percent of the sample in most cases (but even 30 percent in one case). This
should be taken into account when interpreting the results.
Our estimates suggest that considerable regional differences exist in the perceived
corruption in public institutions even after adjusting for ﬁrm characteristics. Compared
to the east, similar ﬁrms in the north generally ﬁnd corruption and informal practices to
be more pronounced, and the positive differences referring to courts and police are even
signiﬁcant on the 5 and 10% levels, respectively. In contrast, southern companies state
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the levels of corruption to be lower than in the east. The negative differences for tax
inspections and customs are signiﬁcant on the 10 percent level. In the west, four of the
six of the differences are negative and that referring to police practices is signiﬁcant at
the 10 percent level. In the west central region, the results are rather similar to the east.
None of the comparably moderate differences are signiﬁcant at any conventional level.
The second question (see Table 5) was about whether ﬁrms comparable to that of
the interviewee have to engage in informal practices when dealing with these institu-
tions.10 This time, no after-matching difference between eastern and northern ﬁrms is
signiﬁcant: the level of corruption indicated in the west central region is again similar to
that in the east. In line with the previous question, southern ﬁrms claim to be signiﬁ-
cantly less engaged (at the 5 percent level) in informal practices when dealing with cus-
toms. Also, the negative difference referring to the court system is borderline
signiﬁcant. Concerning the west, the negative differences referring to courts and police
are signiﬁcant on the 10 and 5% levels, respectively. Interestingly, as in the previous
question, none of the differences in the judgment of the municipal, regional, and
national administrations are signiﬁcant.
The third question (Table 6) was about the presence of informal practices in various
aspects of business life, namely in public procurement, when dealing with suppliers and
buyers, in the remuneration of employees, in job applications, in the use of ﬁrm
resources for private purposes, and in competition with other ﬁrms. After adjusting for
X, no signiﬁcant differences between eastern and northern ﬁrms are found. In contrast,
ﬁrms in the south report encountering signiﬁcantly less informal practices in public pro-
curement, the remuneration of employees, in the use of ﬁrm resources for private pur-
poses, and in competition with other companies. Firms in the west central region state
that they have experienced signiﬁcantly more informal practices in job applications,
while all other differences are insigniﬁcant. Western ﬁrms ﬁnd the use of ﬁrm resources
for private purposes and informal practices when competing with other companies to be
signiﬁcantly less systematic. All in all, the three questions considered so far suggest that
compared to the eastern reference ﬁrms, informal practices and corruption are reported
to be somewhat more prevalent in the north (if anything), rather comparable in the west
central region, and rather less prevalent in the south and the west.
The next question (Table 7) asked whether ﬁrms see corruption as a problem for
their business operations. No statistical differences were found across the regions,
despite the differences in the perceived magnitude of corruption shown in the previous
questions. In particular, corruption does not appear to be seen as a much larger concern
in the east and the north than in the west and the south. In fact, the mean values are
rather high in any region, so that corruption is judged to be similarly detrimental across
all parts of Ukraine considered in the study. To see whether companies have arranged
themselves according to these circumstances, the last question (Table 8) was about strat-
egies for managing or counteracting informal practices in various aspects of business
life. They were asked whether comparable companies interact with local authorities via
third parties (as agents or subcontractors) as a sort of buffer strategy, maintain budgets
for the development of informal relations with local authorities, pro-actively suggest
cooperation with the local authorities form alliances with other ﬁrms against corruption,
mobilize the mass media against corruption, use courts to ﬁght corruption, or ofﬁcially
turn to national authorities to ﬁght local corruption.
After adjusting for X, mean responses in the north are not signiﬁcantly different
from the east. Companies in the south report signiﬁcantly less willingness to cooperate
pro-actively with local authorities. Firms in the west central region claim to mobilize
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mass media and courts against corruption more often (signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level),
as well as to call on national authorities to ﬁght local corruption more frequently (signif-
icant at the 10 percent level). Finally, western ﬁrms state that they make more use of
buffer strategies via third parties when dealing with local authorities (the “outsourcing”
of corruption). While there appears to be some variation in managing/counteracting
informal practices, no clear ordering in the level of activity across regions appears. No
differences were also found in terms of Codes of Conduct and correlated activities such
as the internal training of managers and staff on interaction with counterparties, as well
as the external brieﬁng of partners on the company’s rules and standards for working
with contractors, government, regulatory agencies, and mass media.
To verify the robustness of our ﬁndings, we turn to our second data source: the
BEEPS survey, bearing in mind, however, that it is not as recent (and therefore likely
less relevant) and that the regions in the survey are deﬁned differently. The results are
presented in Tables A.3 and A.4 in Appendix 1 and brieﬂy summarized hereafter. The
ﬁrst question (Table A.3) on how often comparable companies make additional pay-
ments/gifts to various institutions is similar to the question in Table 5. Apart from Kyiv,
reported payments/gifts are signiﬁcantly lower in all other regions when compared to
the east. This holds for payments/gifts in general, as well as more speciﬁcally for pay-
ments/gifts to tax authorities, customs ofﬁcials, and courts. Note that our estimates do
not conﬁrm the results for northern ﬁrms in Table 5, where no signiﬁcant differences to
the east were found. They are, however, in line with the tangentially negative differ-
ences for southern and western companies found in the previous question.
Similar to Table 7, the BEEPS asks respondents whether corruption is regarded as an
obstacle for business operations (see Table A.4). Again, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant
differences across regions, despite the distinct answers in Table A.3. Also, a judgment on
informal competitors is available in the survey. Such competitors seem to be less
detrimental in the west compared to the other regions. This is in line with Table 6, where
informal practices in competition between ﬁrms are rated to be lower in the west than in
the eastern, northern, and west central regions. Finally, the BEEPS also asks whether
respondents consider the court system to be fair and uncorrupted. This view is least
supported in the west, where the difference with the east is marginally signiﬁcant, while
the mean values in any of the other regions do not differ signiﬁcantly from the east.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined differences in the perception of corruption and informal prac-
tices among companies in Ukraine across different regions, which have been exposed to
differing historical development. Considering two surveys of Ukrainian ﬁrms, we used
Table 7. Does corruption hamper your business operations?
Mean
Raw differences to east Diff. after matching
East North South W. Centr West North South W. Centr West
(495 obs.) 2.923 −0.221 −0.154 −0.293 −0.144 −0.001 −0.362 −0.294 −0.291
(p-values) (0.169) (0.076) (0.446) (0.386) (0.995) (0.227) (0.325) (0.423)
On support
(off support)
197(21) 142(27) 208(4) 185(23)
Note: p-values are provided in brackets and are based on 999 bootstrap draws. Outcomes range from 1 (never)
to 4 (systematically).
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propensity score matching to make companies comparable across regions in terms of
size, industry, employee structure, ﬁnancial indicators, and other characteristics that can
potentially affect exposure to corruption. Even after adjusting for such ﬁrm characteris-
tics, our results pointed to cross-regional heterogeneity in the perception of corruption,
which is likely due to distinct cultural, political, and historical developments in the past
and the present. In particular, corruption was found to be less prevalent in the south and
in the west when compared to the east, while the ﬁndings for the northern and central
regions were more ambiguous.
In the light of the current political turmoil, it is interesting whether these regional
differences in perceived corruption can be linked to other differences in recent social
and societal phenomena between the eastern and western regions. While our analysis
does not allow us to establish such links on statistical grounds, it seems nevertheless
instructive to relate them to regional patterns found elsewhere in the literature. One of
the most striking features is the persistently high geographical polarization of election
results (Clem and Craumer 2005). The west favors more reformist and pro-European
parties and movements, as can be seen in its disproportionately large involvement in the
Orange Revolution in 2004 and the current Euromaidan movement, whereas the east
strongly supports the more pro-Russian parties (e.g. the “Party of Regions”), which tra-
ditionally serve as powerbases for the eastern oligarchs coming out of or having close
ties to the former Soviet elite. Corruption, (media) manipulation, and electoral fraud
(which triggered the Orange Revolution) has been well documented in the scholarly dis-
cussion on the political movements controlled by the eastern elite to safeguard their oli-
garchic power and wealth (e.g. Karatnycky 2005; Kuzio 2005). In line with our ﬁndings
for Ukrainian ﬁrms, this seems to suggest that the electorate in the east more readily
accepts corruption and fraudulent behavior, given the overwhelming support (even when
accounting for manipulation) for particular political parties.
Arel (2005) discusses the lack of a strong civil society in the east, which makes the
population more vulnerable to being manipulated by their elites, as one possible reason
for this. He also mentions the desire to preserve the regional, mostly Russophone iden-
tity as a motivation to defy reformist movements, whose political leaders have repeat-
edly challenged the use of Russian as an ofﬁcial language. Indeed, the empirical results
of Constant, Kahanec, and Zimmermann (2011) for instance, suggest that Russian
speakers were signiﬁcantly less likely to vote for the Orange Revolution movement,
even after accounting for differences in preferences for political and economic reforms
with Ukrainian speakers. A further explanation for the support of the old elite could be
the preservation of the privileged economic situation that the Russophone population
continued to experience even after the fall of the Soviet Union (see Constant, Kahanec,
and Zimmermann 2012). Eastern Ukrainians may therefore prioritize their concerns
about the oppression of the Russian language and economic motives (justiﬁed/manipu-
lated or not) over the necessity to punish political misbehavior, which may also favor
the spread of corruption and informal practices in business life and therefore match the
results of this paper.
Whatever drives the regional differences in the levels of perceived corruption in our
data, it is remarkable that, at the same time, corruption is apparently not considered to
be a larger problem for business operations in regions where it is stated to be high. In
fact, Ukrainian companies throughout the country judge the problem to be similarly
severe, which points to the possibility that corruption is largely considered to be “part
of the (business) system” (Svensson 2005; Ledeneva 2013). This suggests that Ukrai-
nian business practices (like other parts of Ukrainian society) have not (yet?) embraced
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the ﬁght against corruption, one of the major demands of the Euromaidan movement. In
countries with endemic corruption – and Ukraine is one of them – the mitigation of cor-
ruption can only begin with the self-reﬂection of all involved actors, from school stu-
dents to business and political elites, on their own behavior. Otherwise, the ﬁght against
corruption will remain nothing but a nice slogan.
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Notes
1. Transparency International score corruption on a scale from 0 (extremely corrupt) to 10 (not
corrupt) until 2011.
2. Combating corruption in Ukraine, 2012, http://www.iahr.com.ua/eng/publications.
3. The Orange Revolution started on 21 November 2004 in the wake of accusations of election
fraud and ended on 26 December 2004 with a new election. Orange was the color of the
supporters of Viktor Yushchenko (elected president in 2004), while the color of his competi-
tor, Viktor Yanukovych (elected president in 2010), was blue.
4. Half of all the economic activity in developing countries remains unregistered; these activi-
ties might be illegal, but they might not (McGahan 2012). The informal sector is also wide-
spread in developed economies; for example, up to 90% of all activity in the construction
sub-trades in New York City and 15% of all employment in Los Angeles County might be
informal (Godfrey 2011). Scholars in management studies should indeed play more attention
to the informal sector of the economy.
5. The country is only now experiencing its ﬁrst generation of young adults who have grown
up with the concept of private property, which is still in development (Markus 2012).
6. The western part of Ukraine belonged to the Habsburg Empire from 1722 to 1914 and then
to Poland from 1919 until 1939. After World War II, it was annexed by the USSR.
7. For further details, see http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology/, accessed 12 August 2013.
8. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) for the corresponding assumption under binary treatments.
9. Raider attacks represent the “disposal of the state-owned property and corporate rights other
than following the privatization proceedings or illegal seizure of a company” (Zimmerer
2012, 2) Zimmerer differentiates between white (using loopholes in current legislation), gray
(using other legal means such as favorable court decisions), and black (using physical vio-
lence, threatening, and bullying) raider attacks. This phenomenon is also widespread in Rus-
sia and other Eastern European countries.
10. The question does not directly refer to the ﬁrm of the interviewee because this may induce
the latter to give socially acceptable responses rather than telling the truth. By referring to
“comparable ﬁrms” this issue is hopefully mitigated.
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Appendix 2. Formal discussion of the identifying assumptions outlined in Section 3
As in Section 3, let D 2 f1; 2; . . .;Rg denote a discrete variable indicating in which of the
1 to R different historical regions a ﬁrm is situated, Y the observed outcome,
Y 1; Y 2; . . .; YR the potential outcomes that would be realized if a ﬁrm was (re-)located to
regions D = 1, 2,… , R, and X the vector of observed ﬁrm characteristics. The CIA for
multiple treatments of Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) is formally stated as follows:
Assumption 1 (conditional independence)
Yd
‘
DjX ¼ x;D ¼ 1; d for all x in the support of X and d 2 f2; . . .;Rg
“
‘
” denotes statistical independence and “D = 1,d” is a shorthand notation for
“D = 1 or D = d”.
As second identifying assumption, we impose a common support restriction within
each subgroup with D = 1 or D = d, stating that no value x in the support of X perfectly
predicts that ﬁrms are located in the east:
Assumption 2 (common support)
PrðD ¼ 1jX ¼ x;D ¼ 1; dÞ\1 for all x in the support of X and d 2 f2; . . .;Rg
Therefore, the conditional probability (or propensity score) to be located in the east
must be smaller than 1 for any value of the ﬁrm characteristics. As in Sections 3 and 4,
we will use p1dðxÞ ¼ PrðD ¼ 1jX ¼ x;D ¼ 1; dÞ as shorthand notation for the propen-
sity score.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the average regional effect on ﬁrms in the east is iden-
tiﬁed by
h1d ¼ E½Y jD ¼ 1  EX ½E½Y jD ¼ d;X jD ¼ 1
¼ E½Y jD ¼ 1  Ep1dðX Þ½E½Y jD ¼ d; p1dðX ÞjD ¼ 1; d 2 f2; . . .;Rg:
The ﬁrst equality follows from (i) E[Y|D = 1] = E[Y1|D = 1], (ii) Assumption 1, imply-
ing that E[Y|D = d, X] = E[Yd|D = d, X] = E[Yd|D = 1, X], (iii) Assumption 2, implying that
we can take the expectation of E[Y|D = d, X] over X given D = 1, and (iv) the law of
iterated expectations, implying that E[Yd|D = 1] = EX[E[Y
d|D = 1, X]|D = 1]. The second
equality follows from Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) who prove that controlling for
p1d(X) is (asymptotically) as good as controlling for X directly, because Yd∐X|p1d(X)
given our assumptions.
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